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Star Industries, Inc. v.
United States:
Sequel to The Chicken War
The United States Customs Court recently found Presidential Proclama-
tion No. 35641 to be invalid, thereby revoking the suspension of certain
trade agreement rates. In so holding, the Court asserted that Article
XXVIII(3) of GATT did not require suspension of trade agreement con-
cessions on a most-favored-nation-basis, but instead authorized only recip-
rocal action against the offending nation which had unilaterally withdrawn
concessions.
The Court further found Section 252(c) of the Trade Expansion Act of
19622 to be an exception to the most-favored-nation principle, thereby
restricting Presidential action to the suspension of trade agreement con-
cessions on the products of offending countries or instrumentalities which
impose unreasonable import restrictions against United State products.
Finally, the Court held that Section 350(a)(6)3 When used in connection
with a 252(c) action is subject to the limitations found in 252(c). 4
Presidential Proclamation No. 3564 was an attempt by the United States
to redress the balance of tariff concessions between the United States and
*B.A., Univ. of Virginia (1967); Candidate for J.D. Degree, June 1972, Univ. of
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'Presidential Proclamation No. 3564 provides in part:
"Whereas the European Economic Community maintains unreasonable import restric-
tions upon imports of poultry from the United States;
"Whereas, having due regard for international obligations of the United States, partic-
ularly paragraph 3 of Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
requiring any suspension of trade agreement concessions to be on a most favored nation
basis...
"Now, 1, Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States, acting under'the authority
vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, including
Section 252(c) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 ... and Section 350(a)(6) of the Tariff Act
of 1930, as amended 19 U SC 1351 (a)(6) ... do hereby proclaim ... 2) the amendment of the
tariff schedules by inserting ... the following: 945.16 Brandy valued over $9.00 per gallon
$5.00 per gallon.
219 USC § 1882(c)(1964).
3 19 USC § 1351(a)(6)(1964).4Star Industries, Inc. v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 1018, 1024 (1970).
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the European Economic Community. This imbalance resulted from the
withdrawal of a German tariff concession, and the subsequent imposition
by the EEC of what the United States considered an unreasonable import
restriction upon United States exports of frozen poultry.5
This article will briefly describe the background of this so-called "chick-
en war." Then a step-by-step analysis will be made of the Court's major
findings: First, that Article XXVIII (3) of GATT does not require suspen-
sion of trade agreement concessions on a most-favored-nation basis; sec-
ond, that Section 252(c) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 is an ex-
ception to the most-favored-nation principle, and is thus a limitation on
Presidential action; and third, that Section 350(a)(6) is regulated by Section
252(c) when used in conjunction with it.
Chicken War
In the 1950's farmers in the United States made great progress in
rationalizing the raising, processing and distribution of poultry. 6 Coupled
with this development was the easing and finally the removal (1957-61) of
the quotas and foreign exchange restrictions which had been necessary to
protect the Deutsch mark. 7 Although some restrictions remained, including
the German tariff of 15 percent CIF (about 4t a pound) and a production
subsidy of about 6.1 cents a pound, 8 they did not present a major obstacle
to trade and sales grew phenomenally. 9
In 1958, sales reached 2.5 million dollars; in 1959, 12.5 million; in 1960,
23.0 million; in 1961, 35.5 million; and by 1962, 50 million dollars in sales
were expected. 10 The prospects for a continuation of this favorable trade
position, however, were considerably dimmed by the Treaty of Rome.
Under the Treaty, all customs duties between the EEC nations would be
eliminated and replaced by an EEC tariff, applicable to all non-EEC im-
ports. 1 Thus it was clear that the EEC poultry farmers would receive
preferential treatment when the Common Agricultural Policy was imple-
mented; the only question was how preferential the policy would be.
GATT members met in September, 1960, to negotiate the compensatory
concessions that were necessary because of the formation of the Common
5See Clubb, Dismantling Trade Barriers: Implementation of the Trade Expansion Act,
1965 11. L. F. 366, 368 (1965); U.S. Tariff Commission, Operation of the Trade Agreements
Program, 16th Report, 46- 47 (1963).6Walker, Dispute Settlement: The Chicken War, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 671 (1964).7CIubb, supra note 5, at 368.
8The subsidy was to cover the higher cost of feed grain in Germany. Id.
91d. at 369.
'°Walker, supra note 6.
11Clubb, supra note 5, at 369-70.
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Market. 12 These negotiations were conducted under Article XXIV:6 of
GATT 13 which was created to cover such a situation. Under GATT, the
compensation could take the form of some other concession by the Com-
mon Market, or if this failed, a withdrawal of concessions by the United
States.
4
At the conference there was disagreement over whether the United
States had a claim at all, and if it did, how great it was. Although the two
sides did reach agreement on the great majority of products under review
in the XXIV:6 negotiation they were not able to reach agreement on rates
on poultry and various grains, because of the unsettled nature of the
Common Agricultural Policy of the EEC. Consequently, in order to con-
clude the negotiations as a whole, the parties agreed to postpone settlement
of this question and maintain the status quo, pending EEC decisions on
their Common Agricultural Policy. The United States formally reserved
whatever negotiating rights that it possessed.'
5
The Common Market made its decision on poultry, reactivating the
dispute, on January 14, 1963, in EEC Council Regulation 22; and the
restriction on the importation of poultry into the EEC was very strict.'
6
The Regulation was really four separate restrictions which included 1) an
increase in the EEC preferential duty; 2) a feed grain compensatory duty;
3) a decreasing national duty; and 4) a duty applied if necessary to enforce
the EEC's minimum price regulation. The Regulation went into effect on
July 30, 1963, and had predictably drastic consequences for United States
poultry exporters. There was an immediate increase in rates on United
States imports of poultry into Germany from 4.8 cents a pound to 9.7 cents
per pound. Moreover, the rates continued to rise, and by August, 1963,
they had reached 13.43 cents per pound, a 280% increase.' 7 As a result of
121d.
13GATT art. XXIV:6:
If, in fulfilling the requirements of subparagraph 5(a) [taking the tariff steps implicit in
constructing a tariff union], a contracting party proposes to increase any rate of duty in-
consistently with the provisions of Article 2 [breach a binding], the procedure set forth in
Article XXVIII shall apply ... [inserts from Walker,supra note 4, at 673].
1aWalker, The Chicken War: Steps Toward Arbitration, 19 ARB. J. (n.s.) 38-40 (1964);
Jackson, The Puzzle ofGATT, I J.W. TRADE 131 (1967).
15Clubb, supra note 5, at 369-71.
AThe United States was very concerned by the imposition of Council Regulation 22-far
more so than the actual importance of the German market to American producers of poultry.
Chickens were the first of the group of products on which a standstill agreement had been
reached to be subjected to a definite import fee. The high level of the fee reflected a victory
for protectionist forces within the EEC, and thus constituted a step that might foreshadow the
demise of the lucrative [1.2 billion] agricultural export to the EEC. Walker, supra note 6, at
672. See also Dal Liden, Agricultural Policy and the Import of Poultry Meat from the United
States, I COMMON MARKET L. REV. 339 (1963).
171d. at 37 1-2.
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this rate increase American exports of poultry to Germany fell from 50
million dollars annually to around 20 million a year.18
Various attempts were made by the United States to solve this problem,
including a United States call for negotiations under the 1962 "standstill
agreement." However, all efforts were unsuccessful, and on August 6,
1963, the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations announced that
the United States intended to retaliate under Article XXVILI(3) of
GATT. 19 This retaliation would take the form of an increase in duties on a
substantially equal amount of EEC exports to the United States. The
Trade Negotiator then drew up a list of products upon which concessions
might be withdrawn, and consequently held hearings (Sept. 4- 12) on the
items to be withdrawn. 20
The United States and the EEC also disagreed on the amount of com-
pensation due as a result of the withdrawal of the German tariff.2' The
United States claimed 46 million dollars while the EEC proposed a
19-million-dollar figure. The matter was finally submitted to a Committee
of GATT experts in October, 1963, and a figure of 26 million was handed
down. 22 The United States agreed to this figure, and on December 4, 1963,
President Johnson issued Presidential Proclamation No. 3564 which sus-
pended the trade agreement concessions on potato starch, soluble and
chemically treated starches, dextrine, trucks over 1,000 dollars, and brandy
over $9 per gallon. 23 The rates were suspended on a most-favored-nation
'
8Walker, supra note 6, at 671. There was also controversy over whether the United
States qualified as the "principal supplier" under the terms of Article XXVIII. Under that
Article a claim depends on the contracting party's standing, either as the "initial negotiator"
or the "principal supplier." As Denmark was the initial negotiator, the United States at-
tempted to qualify as the principal supplier. Whether it could, depended on what years the
statistics were drawn from. GATT set down only general guidelines, and the United States
and the EEC were unable to agree on the base for the statistics. This question was never
formally resolved, although the GATT panel by settling on the 26 million figure, implicitly
found the United States to be the principal supplier.
It should be noted that in Article XXVIII, there is a third category, "substantial
supplier" which although limited to consultation may retaliate if dissatisfied. Walker, supra
note 6, at 677.
"
9The basic provision for retaliation, Article XXIII, was not used because the aggrieved
party, the United States, did not have an issue which had yet matured to the point of being
suitable for referral under that Article. Instead the situation was tailor-made for the use of
Article XXVIII. As mentioned, the retaliatory right provided for in Article XXVIII is
incorporated by reference in Article XXIV:6, the basis for the negotiations. Thus if a tariff
commitment is cancelled, the party offended has the right to restore the upset balance by
retaliation if no agreement can be reached on a replacement commitment. Such was the case
here. Walker, supra note 14, at 38-39, 46.20CIubb, supra note 5, at 373.211d.
22Basic Instruments, 65 (12th Supp. 1964). Text of findings can be found in 3 INT. LEGAL
MATERIALS 116.
2Star Industries, Inc. v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 1018- 1020 (1970).
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basis, that is, the higher rates would apply indiscriminately, whether the
products came from EEC members or elsewhere. 24 The President in-
dicated that this was necessary because of the provisions in Article
XXVIII(3) of GATT.
Thus the matter stood, until Star Industries, Inc. brought suit in United
States Custom Court, claiming that the President was without power to
suspend trade agreement concessions on a most-favored-nation basis, as he
had received no Congressional authorization for such action. Star argued
that the relevant domestic legislation merely allowed retaliation against the
offending nation or instrumentality 2 5 -in this case, the EEC. Star also
claimed that the Proclamation illegally attempted to terminate prior procla-
mations. Star had standing to assert these claims because the company had
imported brandy from Spain, a non-EEC nation, and in the process, was
subject to the higher duty rate.
Contentions of the Parties
Plaintiff
As mentioned above, plaintiff raised two major issues- 1) that Section
252(c) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 does not authorize the Presi-
dent to suspend the trade agreement rates on countries not parties to the
dispute; and 2) that Section 135 1(a)(6) cannot be used to terminate all prior
proclamations when section 252(c) action is involved.
On the first issue, the plaintiffs relied on the wording of Section 252(c)
and the legislative history of the section. 26 The plaintiffs also contended
that Section 252(c) was intended to function independently of GATT and
that the phrase in Section 252(c)-"having due regard for the international
obligations of the United States"-was not meant to include executive
agreements such as GATT, but only treaties. 27 It used legislative history to
support this contention also. Thus, according to the Star rationale, Section
24U.S. Tariff Report, supra note 5, at 46-7. As a result of the United States retaliation,
EEC exports to the United States of the five affected products fell from about $25 million in
1963 to about 12 million in 1964. Steiner & Vagts, Transnational Legal Problems 1089
(1968). There was a strong possibility that the EEC would counter-retaliate if the United
States had carried out its threat to withdraw concessions on the full $46 million. It is for this
reason that the utilization of the GATT panel and the acceptance of its findings, is considered
a significant achievement in dispute settlement. For a general discussion of the dispute
settlement techniques of GATT, see Jackson, GA TT as an Instrument for the Settlement of
Trade Disputes, 1967, AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 44.
2Brief for Plaintiffs at 6, Star Industries, Inc. v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 1018
(1970).
26As the Court accepted this argument, it will be discussed in detail in the section dealing
with the Court's holding.27 Brief for Plaintiff at 15-21, Star Industries, Inc. v. United. States, 320 F. Supp. 1018
(1970).
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252(c) is an exception to the application of the most-favored-nation prin-
ciple, and was intended to function independently of, or override, GATT.
On the second issue, Star argued that there was a distinction between
suspension of rates provided for in the statute, and the termination of rates
set out in the Presidential Proclamation. Thus the President had no author-
ity under Section 252(c) to terminate prior proclamations. However, there
is another provision in the trade agreements legislation, Section 135 1(a)(6),
that does provide for termination of proclamations. Star argued here that
the termination clause could not be used to override the limitations placed
on Presidential action in 252(c) itself. Or, stated positively, whenever the
135 1(a)(6) termination power is used in conjunction with a 252(c) action, it
is subject to the limitations of 252(c). 28 (United States v. Schmidt Pritchard
& Co., 47 CCPA 152, C.A.D. 1960.)
Defendant's Contentions
The Justice Department argued that Section 252(c) does allow the sus-
pension of trade agreement rates on a most-favored-nation basis, that is, to
all countries, not just the EEC. The defendant drew mainly upon legislative
history to support its interpretation of the statute. 29 Justice further con-
tended that GATT was intended to be included in the "having due regard
for the international obligations of the United States" section of 252(c).
The Department cited a number of cases for the proposition that execu-
tive agreements such as GATT have been treated as treaties for in-
terpretation purposes similar to the instant case.30 It should be added that
the Justice Department brief did not discuss whether Article XXVIII(3) of
GATT allowed nonapplication of the most-favored-nation clause in retalia-
tory situations. It appears that the Justice Department merely assumed
what the Presidential Proclamation had stated3 l -Article XXVIII(3) re-
quired retaliation on a most-favored-nation basis.
On the second issue, Justice cited a string of cases for its contention that
courts have construed Section 135 1(a)(6) as a valid provision authorizing
the President to terminate at any time a proclamation in whole or in part,
irrespective of special provisions in the trade agreements legislation. Jus-
tice also advanced the point that suspension and termination could be
equated.
281d. at 22-24.
29Brief for Defendants at 14-18, Star Industries, Inc. v. United States, 320 F. Supp.
1018 (1970).301d. at 18- 2 1.31Brief for Defendants at 18, Star Industries, Inc. v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 1018
(1970).
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Findings of the Court
The Customs Court in reaching its decision carved out its own position
on the issues presented by the case, especially on the question of the
application of the most-favored-nation clause under Article XXVIII(3) of
GATT. Thus it will be useful independently to evaluate the Court's hold-
ing and rationale on the major questions that it decided.
Relevance of GATT to Section 252(c) and
Interpretation of A rticle XXVIII(3)
As noted above, there was sharp disagreement between the parties over
the relevance of GATT obligations in a 252(c) proceeding to retaliate for
unreasonable import restrictions. Oddly, the Court never specifically com-
mented on whether the international obligation phrase in Section 252(c)
included GATT or not. However, as this was the basic premise on which
the decision rested, it must be accepted as part of the Court's holding.
Thus, having decided sub silentio that Section 252(c) did include GATT,
the Court proceeded to interpret Article XXVIII(3) of GATT.
In construing Article XXVIII(3) the Court found that application of the
most-favored-nation clause was not required, thereby rejecting a major
premise of the Presidential Proclamation, and reworking one of the major
arguments presented by the Justice Department.32 In doing this, the Court
was acting on its own initiative, as the plaintiffs had argued that GATT
should not be considered in a Section 252(c) proceeding and accordingly
had not advanced a substantive interpretation of Article XXVIII(3). Jus-
tice had argued that GATT was applicable but they also did not advance a
substantive interpretation. Instead Justice seemed to rely on the Presi-
dent's interpretation put forth in the Proclamation.
An explanatory note should be added here. Assuming that GATT is a
valid executive agreement 33 -and this has been disputed3 4-the Trade
Agreements Act of 1962 would still invalidate any part of the GATT with
which it was inconsistent. However, if the international obligation clause of
Section 252(c) is interpreted to include GATT strictures as the Court
holds, then the interpretation of Article XXVIII(3) obviously becomes
crucial. However, the substantive interpretation of the Article was not
mentioned in either brief, and the Court devoted only one short paragraph
to the question. Moreover, within the short paragraph the Court restricted
itself totally to a language argument.
32 Star Industries, Inc. v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 1018, 1022 (1970).
3See Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic
Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 249, 312 (1967).
341d.
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It is submitted that the interpretation of Article XXVIII(3) is not as
clear, either as the Court or the Presidential Proclamation intimated, and
that it is not settled whether Article XXVIII(3) of the GATT requires
application of the most-favored-nation clause. In addition, it is suggested
that the Court's framework for analysis was too restricted, in that the
Court looked only to the language of the Article in reaching its con-
clusions. Undoubtedly, statutory construction should begin here; however,
reliance on language alone has a number of faults. It tends to obscure the
actual decision-making process and expresses conclusions rather than ra-
tionales.
Further, this approach suffers from an almost total lack of analysis, and
ignores relevant aids in construction such as legislative history, past appli-
cations, and policy considerations. The instant case is a classic example of
these faults, as will be shown hereunder. With these value choices as
explicit guidelines, an examination will be made of the Court's holding that
Article XXVIII(3) of GATT does not require suspension of trade-
agreement concessions on a most-favored-nation basis.
GATT
Article XXVIII(3) reads in part:
(a) If agreement between the contracting parties primarily concerned
cannot be reached.., any contracting party determined... to have a princi-
pal supplying interest and any contracting party determined ... to have a
substantial interest shall then be free ... to withdraw ... substantially equiv-
alent concessions initially negotiated with the applicant contracting party.
As the Court correctly indicates, "most-favored-nation treatment is not
even mentioned or implied in paragraph 3."35
... party shall be free... to withdraw... substantially equivalent conces-
sions negotiated with the applicant contracting party. (Court's emphasis) 3 6
However, the fallacy of looking only to the wording of a statute could not
be better illustrated -for the Preparatory Committee that handled the pro-
vision indicated that there was to be non-discrimination in the withdrawal
of concessions:
Non-discrimination in "withdrawal of substantially equal concessions"
-Article XXVIII Paragraph 3:
It was agreed that there was no intention to interfere in any way with the
operation of the most-favored-nation clause.3 7
In addition at least one scholar has asserted that the general rule of GATT,
35Star Industries, Inc. v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 1018, 1022 (1970).36GATT, art. XXVIII, para. 3(a)(in part).
37Analytical Index 145, quoting 2nd session of Preparatory Commission of UN Confer-
ence on Trade and Development, p. 46 (1947).
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that withdrawal of concessions granted to a particular party amounts to
withdrawal from all parties, is applicable to Article XXVIII(3). 8
Thus, it is evident that application of the most-favored-nation clause in
an Article XXVIII(3) is not as certain as the Court asserts. Consequently,
it is necessary to examine the practice under Article XXVIII(3) and
related retaliatory Articles, and the policy considerations underlying the
application of most-favored-nation treatment in retaliatory withdrawal of
concessions in order to determine the scope and application of XXVIII(3).
Unfortunately, at least for the purposes of analysis, few disputes appear
to have arisen in connection with Article XXVIII(3) itself.39 However,
there are several other provisions in GATT that provide for retaliatory
action. Although there are differences in wording and in the method of
invoking the relief,40 the basic policy underlying each Article is the same,
thus allowing a comparative examination of the practice under these Arti-
cles.
Article XXIII which provides the basic machinery for dispute set-
tlement under GATT, permits retaliation when approved by the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES. Although almost twenty disputes have reached
the stage of panel reports, in only one case have the CONTRACTING
PARTIES authorized the withdrawal of concessions or obligations under
Article XXIII(2).4 And in this case, the CONTRACTING PARTIES
did not apply the most-favored-nation clause, allowing the Netherlands to
impose quantitative restrictions upon imports of wheat from the United
States. 42
Article XIX also contains a retaliatory provision, and although there are
significant differences in Articles XIX and XXVIII(3), 43 both rest on the
38MUHAMMED, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF WORLD TRADE 123-4 (1958).
39 K. DAM, GATT- LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 90 (1970).40 The main differences in the retaliatory provisions of Articles 3 & 19 and Article 28(3) is
that Article 28(3) requires no special authority, DAM, supra note 39, at 86.
GATT, art. XXIII states in part:
2.... If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances are serious
enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party.., to suspend the
application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions ... as they determine
to be appropriate in the circumstances.
GATT, art. XIX states in part:
I. (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the obligations incurred by a
contracting party under this agreement, any product is being imported ... [so] as to cause or
threaten serious injury to domestic producers . . . , the contracting party shall be free ... to
suspend the obligation ... or to withdraw or modify the concession.41 K. DAM, supra note 39, at 356, 63.42Analytical Index, supra note 37, at 120. Further types of exceptions to the most-
favored-nation clause [in GATT] are:
"b) the complaints procedure under Article XXIII which in the last resort allows
sanctions in the case of non-fulfillment of an obligation and which can be applied to the
offending country only." G. CURZON, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY 66 (1965).
43K. DAM, supra note 39, at 103- 106.
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retaliatory suspension of substantially equal concessions. One scholar,
Professor K. Damm, has argued against the application of the
most-favored-nation clause in the retaliatory situation of Article XIX.44 In
the landmark case of retaliation under Article XIX, the United States
withdrawal of concessions from Czechoslovakia, GATT upheld a with-
drawal of concessions from only Czechoslovakia, accepting the principle of
non-application of the most-favored-nation clause in an Article XIX ac-
tion. 45
After deciding to suspend the obligations between the two countries, the
CONTRACTING PARTIES affirmed "that any measure which may be
taken by the United States or by Czechoslovakia shall in no way modify the
obligations of that government under the General Agreement." 46
Thus, application of the most-favored-nation clause cannot be deter-
mined on the basis of practice alone, because of the lack of precedent
under Article XXVIII(3) itself. However, the analogies drawn from other
Articles do lend support to the Court's contention that the most-
favored-nation principle should not apply.
It remains to examine the policy considerations underlying the appli-
cation or non-application of the most-favored-nation principle in retaliatory
situations such as Article XXVIII(3) actions; and it is submitted that
policy strongly favors the non-application of the most-favored-nation prin-
ciple in these situations.
A basic distinction must be made at the outset between an original and a
retaliatory suspension of concessions. In the case of original suspensions,
the same arguments apply against non-application of the most-
favored-nation principle that apply to discriminatory tariffs in general. 47
However, we are concerned only with retaliatory suspensions, and in
these there are entirely different policy considerations. First, as Professor
Johnson has pointed out, one of the criteria for successful dispute set-
tlement is the protection of the interests of non-parties. However, when the
most-favored-nation principle is applied in retaliatory situations, it becomes
difficult to limit the effects of the trade of the contracting party initially
withdrawing a concession.
In the instant case, the United States went to great lengths to insure that
the effect of the retaliation was restricted mainly to EEC nations. 48 Thus
the United States seemed to accept the policy argument supporting the
441d.
45id. at 101- 103; see also Note, 61 COL. L. REV. 505, 536 (1961).
46MUHAMMED, supra note 38, at 123-4, quoting Basic Instruments, Vol. 2, p. 36.4 71n the case of original suspensions, there seems to be no strong argument for the
non-application of the most-favored-nation clause ... K. DAM, supra note 39, at 104.
48In selecting the articles on which to increase duties, the United States chose com-
modities of interest chiefly to the EEC countries. Nevertheless, such articles were also
International Lawyer, Vol. 6, No. I
58 INTERNATIONAL LA WYER
non-application of the most-favored-principle in retaliatory situations.
However, as was pointed out in the Presidential Proclamation, the Presi-
dent felt legally bound by GATT to withdraw concessions on a
most-favored-nation basis. In this instance, the United States largely suc-
ceeded in limiting the effects of the retaliation, with only one million dollars
of imported goods from countries outside the EEC affected by the Procla-
mation.49
However this may not be possible in future situations and the effect of
applying the most-favored-nation principle could be devastating to trade
relations. As Professor Dam has pointed out, there are possibilities for an
unraveling of the interwoven, interdependent system of tariff bindings if the
most-favored-nation principle is applied. 50 Further, there is a check if the
non-application of the most-favored-nation principle is abused in an Article
XXVIII(3) action. There is still the remedy under Article XXIII to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES to review the discriminatory withdrawal of
concessions. 5 1
Secondly, when the retaliating party applies the most-favored-nation
principle, it is more likely that an industry not specially deserving protec-
tion will receive the protection. The instant case is an example of this. The
poultry producers in the United States were not benefitted at all by the
retaliation; nor were consumers. However, producers of dextrine, potato
starch, and trucks received an unexpected and undeserved benefit.5 2
In conclusion, then, we are presented with a far more complex situation
with regard to the application of the most-favored-nation principle in an
Article XXVIII(3) action, than the Court's unqualified conclusion would
lead us to believe. The wording, policy and practice under related Articles
call for non-application of the most-favored-nation principle in an Article
XXVIII(3) action. However, the opinion of the Preparatory Committee,
the United States interpretation of the Article, and some scholarly opinions
cut the other way. It is the position of this author that the non-application
approach be adopted on policy considerations.
affected when imported from third countries, which had been entitled to trade agreement rates
of duty. United States imports of the articles from the EEC in 1962 were valued at about 24
million, and those from all other countries at about one million. U.S. Tariff Commission, supra
note 5, at 47. [Quoted in DAM, supra note 39, at 357].491d. Since the most favored nation clause was applied, the United States was theo-
retically open to injury claims from countries not party to the dispute. As mentioned, the
United States went to great lengths to assure minimal impact on third nation imports. Even
with this precaution, however, a British Board of Trade claimed that the American market for
British light vans had been destroyed by the duty increase, and the British government ought
to claim injury under Article XXIII. Walker, supra note 4, at 681.
50 DAM, supra note 39, at 357.51GATT, art. XXIII.
52 K. DAM, supra note 39, at 104-5, 357-8.
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However, even if this interpretation of Article XXVIII(3) is accepted,
major problems may still remain. For example, what occurs if Section
252(c) is construed so as to include GATT, and Article XXVIII(3) is
given the Court's interpretation, but then the rest of Section 252(c) is
construed so as to require most-favored-nation treatment. In other words,
how can the President suspend duty rates on a most-favored-nation basis,
and still have due regard for the international obligations of the United
States (Assuming the Court's interpretation)?
Fortunately, the Court was not forced to solve this riddle because it
interpreted Section 252(c) in a manner that didn't require most-
favored-nation treatment. Unfortunately, however, the Court's lack of
analysis mentioned above, in regard to the court's treatment of Article
XXVIII(3), is still present in its handling of Section 252(c) itself. This is
especially unfortunate because there is strong support in the legislative
history for the Court's position. Thus it will be necessary to examine the
legislative history of Section 252(c) to determine the degree of support that
it offers for the Court's position.
Trade Expansion Act of 1962
Section 252(c) provides:
Whenever a foreign country of instrumentality, the products of which
receive benefits of trade agreement concessions made by the United States,
maintains unreasonable import restrictions which either directly or indirectly
substantially burden United States commerce, the President may, to the
extent that such action is consistent with the purposes of section 1801 of this
title, and having due regard for the international obligations of the United
States -
1) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of benefits of trade
agreement concessions to products of such country or instrumentality . ....
Before an analysis of Section 252(c) itself is made, brief mention of its
predecessor, Section 350(a)(5) is necessary. Prior to 1962, Section
350(a)(5) of the Tariff Act was the only specific delegation of authority to
deal with foreign import restrictions, other than that of the agreement
making authority itself.54 And as has unqualifiedly been pointed out, Sec-
tion 350(a)(5) "constituted an exception to the most-favored-nation treat-
ment." 55 This statement is supported by the practice under the Act. Al-
though it was utilized infrequently, when it was used it was directed against
only one nation, and the most-favored-nation principle was not applied.
5319 USC § 1882(c) (1964).54Mathews, Non-Tariff Import Restrictions: Remedies Available in United States Law,
62 MICH. L. REV. 1295, 1343 (1964).
551d.
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For example, Section 350(a)(5) was used against Germany in 1935, and
Australia in 1937.56
The successor to Section 350(a)(5) was Section 252 of the Trade Ex-
pansion Act of 1962. 5 7 It is suggested that the changes made in what was
to become Section 252 were directed against other problems, and neither
Congress or the Executive Branch attempted to alter the non-application of
the most-favored-nation principle. This assertion is backed by the legisla-
tive history of Section 252.
When the Executive Brance submitted its proposals on what was to
become the TEA to Congress, it furnished a section by section analysis of
the Executive Branch's position." 8 In relation to what was to become
Section 252 the Report stated:
Section 241 (now 25 1) Most-favored-nation principle
The principal exceptions to this principle ... are ... section 242 (now
252) (suspension of benefits). 59
Countries discriminating against United States commerce
A second exception to the ... (M-F-N clause) is set forth in sec-
tion 242 (now 252) of the bill ... 60
Thus, it is clear beyond all doubt that the Executive Branch intended no
change in the non-application of the most-favored-nation principle in a
retaliatory situation. If any change was made, it must have been made
within Congress. We must therefore turn to the legislative history of the
Section to see if Congress intended any such change.
The House Ways and Means Committee, in reporting out the bill, made
a number of changes in Section 242 (now 252) of the Administration's
bill. 6 1However, none of these changes concerned the application of the
most-favored-nation principle. As one commentator stated, "the Com-
mittee (merely) ... amplified the directive of the President to withhold
trade concessions from the offending nation.62 (emphasis added)
Part (c) of Section 252 on which the Presidential Proclamation was
based was not in the bill as yet; it became part of the bill through an
amendment in the Senate. The brief for the Justice Department attached
56S. Metzger, Trade Agreements and the Kennedy Round 31-34 (1963).5 7Mathews, supra note 54, at 1344.
58H. Rep. No. 9900, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1962), quoting Section by Section Analysis
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, prepared by the Executive Branch, p. 36.
591d.601d., at 938.611d. See also Mathews, supra note 54, at 1346.621d. The commentator further added,
the net effect of the retaliatory amendments adopted by the Ways and Means is to
focus attention on the existence, of these remedial measures and to communicate more
forcefully to the Executive branch the intention that they be used." See also Metzger, 5 1
GEO. L.J. 425, 436-9 (1963).
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great importance to this. However, the purpose of adding 252(c) as ex-
plained in the Senate Report, was to provide redress where an import
restriction, although legal, was unreasonable. 63 Thus it did not concern the
application of the most-favored-nation principle at all. In fact, if Section
252 is examined closely, it becomes apparent that the whole Section has a
unitary, cohesive structure. This can be seen both from the similarity in
paragraph structure and wording, and from the related purposes of each
subsection. Consequently, the following statement made in the House
Report was not affected by the addition of subsection (c):
Principal exceptions to this general rule (M-F-N) are as follows:
b) Foreign import restrictions- . . . (section 252)64
As noted, the Senate added the specific section upon which the Presi-
dential Proclamation relied-252(c). This amendment was added for the
sole purpose of showing the Senate's concern with restrictions that while
legal were unreasonable. Section 350(a)(5) had provided relief for this type
of restriction; the Senate in adding subsection (c) merely provided a spe-
cific remedy where a general formula had existed. 65 Moreover, if any more
evidence was needed to show that the addition of subsection (c) did not
affect the non-application of the most-favored-nation principle, the Senate
Report provided it:
The reference in the "except" clause [exceptions to M-F-N] make clear
that restrictions imposed under... 252... need not apply to products of all
countries.66
In summary, then, both the wording and the legislative history of section
252(c) strongly support the non-application of the most-favored-nation
principle in the withdrawal of concessions. It could also be added that this
is desirable on policy grounds as well. First, because as mentioned earlier it
permits the more precise use of the tool of withdrawal of concessions and
prevents retaliations by non-parties who would be injured if the
631d.64H. Rep. No. 1818, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1962), p. 20-22.
6Mathews, supra note 54, at 1344.
66S. Rep. No. 2059, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2, 3, 16 (1962). Justice made what at first
appears to be a good point here-that since the Report says the M-F-N clause need not apply,
then by implication it may apply. The Court did not mention this point. It is suggested that the
use of the word "need" was an attempt to emphasize that the M-F-N clause did not apply tfo
retaliatory suspensions. There is support for this view. First, the statement refers to all of
Section 252, not merely subsection (c), and not even the Justice Department attempted to
show that the M-F-N clause applied to all of Section 252(c). In fact, the Justice Department
based its case on distinguishing the legislative history of subsection (c) from the rest of the
Section. Secondly, as shown, there is conclusive proof that Section 252(a) & (b) do not permit
application of the M-F-N clause. Thus, since the word "need" applies to the whole Section,
and not just to subsection (c), it is submitted that the Justice Department's contention is
without merit.
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most-favord-nation principle was applied. Second, interpreting 252(c) in
accordance with the GATT provision (assuming GATT is construed the
same way) makes for a harmonious situation better suited to further world
trade. Real problems would arise however, if GATT were interpreted
differently. Fortunately, we do not have to confront this problem.
Section 1351(a)(6)
The Court makes its most analytical argument on the last question
presented for decision67 -the scope of 1351(a)(6) when used in a Section
252(c) action. Section 1351 (a)(6) reads:
a) The President may at any time terminate, in whole or in part, any procla-
mation made pursuant to this section. 8
Thus, from the language it might seem that the provision would allow the
President to terminate the trade agreement rates completely (on an M-F-N
basis) regardless of the dispute over the GATT and Section 252(c). How-
ever, as the Court points out, this Section should be read in conjunction
with Section 252(c). The Court argued that when 1351(a)(6) is used with
Section 252(c) as was the case here, it is subject to the same limitations, it
cannot be applied to all countries. 6
9
Briefly put, the President undertook by his Proclamation to add rates to
a particular subpart of the tariff schedule. This subpart was reserved for
Section 252(c) actions, hence its use in this case. Consequently, the sub-
stantive limitations of 252(c) restrict the use of the 135 1(a)(6) termination
power. As the Court correctly pointed out, "if the President had elect-
ed ... to terminate, pursuant to Section 135 1 (a)(6), all of the proclaimed
rates on brandy outstanding and intervening between the statutory and the
GATT rate, he could have done so.'"7 ° However, he did not use the power
independently; instead he used Section 1351(a)(6) in conjunction with
Section 252(c). Thus Section 135 1 (a)(6) limited by Section 252(c) could be
used only against EEC countries.
Conclusion
It is the position of the author that the holding of the Customs Court
should be affirmed on appeal. However, as noted earlier, the Court offered
little analysis for its conclusions and restricted itself to the language of the
statutory material. Using this approach, the Court could offer nothing more
6 7Star Industries, Inc. v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 1018, 1023-4 (1970).
6819 USC § 135(a)(6) (1964).
69Star Industries, Inc. v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 1018, 1023 (1970).
701d. at 1023.
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to support its position than that the statutory material was "plain" or
"without ambiguity." It is submitted that this is too limited an approach
and even though the statutory language does support the Court, this meth-
od obscures much that is relevant and which should be openly considered
by the Court.
First, the, question of whether Article XXVIII(3) of GATT entails
application of the most-favored-nation principle is not settled. The Court
should explicitly recognize this point, and explore the history of the draft-
ing of the Article, and what practice there has been under like Articles. In
addition, the Court should consider the policy factors underlying the appli-
cation or non-application of the most-favored-nation principle in retaliatory
situations. It is the position of this author that the wording of the Article,
the practice under related Articles, and the policy considerations point to a
holding for non-application.
Secondly, the Court should explicitly state that the phrase "international
obligations" in Section 252(c) includes the GATT obligations. This too can
be supported on a policy rationale. Also the Court should make use of the
legislative history of Section 252 to support its conclusion that Section
252(c) does not require application of the most-favored-nation clause.
Finally, it should be noted that although the Court's holding in this case
will not have a great economic effect, as only one million dollars of
non-EEC goods were affected by the Proclamation, the opinion will set a
useful precedent in the interpretation of both Article XXVIII(3) and Sec-
tion 252(c), and will make both more precise and therefore more useful
tools in combatting the unreasonable imposition of tariff restrictions.
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